(Come see Col. Macgregor LIVE at the Ron Paul Institute Sept 2nd DC Conference!)
Incrementalism—the tendency to inch forward rather than to take bold steps—is usually preferred by political and military leaders in warfare, because the introduction of a few forces into action puts fewer personnel at risk, and, in theory, promises a series of improvements over time, often through attrition.
In 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led by the then-chairman General J. Lawton Collins, recommended short envelopments along the Korean coastline that were designed to gradually increase the size of the US and Allied enclave known as the Pusan Perimeter. The idea was to buy time to assemble enough forces to launch a breakout on the Normandy model. But General of the Army Douglas MacArthur disagreed. He argued for a daring, deep envelopment that promised to cut off the North Korean Forces south of the 38th Parallel that were encircling Pusan.
ncrementalism—the tendency to inch forward rather than to take bold steps—is usually preferred by political and military leaders in warfare, because the introduction of a few forces into action puts fewer personnel at risk, and, in theory, promises a series of improvements over time, often through attrition.
In 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led by the then-chairman General J. Lawton Collins, recommended short envelopments along the Korean coastline that were designed to gradually increase the size of the US and Allied enclave known as the Pusan Perimeter. The idea was to buy time to assemble enough forces to launch a breakout on the Normandy model. But General of the Army Douglas MacArthur disagreed. He argued for a daring, deep envelopment that promised to cut off the North Korean Forces south of the 38th Parallel that were encircling Pusan.
In international relations and war, the defining features of human identity—history, geography, culture, religion, language, race, or ethnicity—must also figure prominently in any strategic assessment. For reasons of culture, experience, and innate character, MacArthur was a risk-taker. As Peter Drucker reminds his readers, culture is the foundation for human capital. These realities routinely defeat the unrealistic expectations that rational choice theory creates.
Instead of approaching the negotiating table, Washington discarded the caution, given Russia’s nuclear arsenal, that had guided previous American dealings with Moscow. Washington’s political class, with no real understanding of Russia or Eastern Europe, subscribed to the late Senator John McCain’s notion that Russia was a “gas station with nuclear weapons.”
Read the rest here.
